Hollis E. Walker v. Levi G. Peterson : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1954
Hollis E. Walker v. Levi G. Peterson : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Walter G. Mann; Attorney for Defendant and Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation






Case No. 8213 
In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
HOLLIS E. WALKER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
~~\ I ."' ., ).;- , , ,_ ff::;- •·!~ 
LEVI G. PETERSEN, 
Defendant and Appellant 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Walter G. Mann 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABL.E OF CONTENTS 
• Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS --------------------------------------------------------1 
STATEMENT OF POINTS -------------------------------------------------- 7 ARG UME·NT __________ ------------- ___________________________________________ ---------- 8 
POINT 1. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN 
FAILING TO FIND THE PLAINTIFF 
GUILTY OF C'ONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE, AFTER HE FOUND THE 
PLAINTIFF GUILTY O·F NEGLIGENCE --------·----- 7 
POINT 2. THAT THE CO·URT ERRED AFTER 
FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS 
DRIVING TOO FAST FOR EXISTING CO·N-
DITIONS AND WAS DRIVING IN EXCESS 
OF THE POSTED SPEED UPON SAID 
HIGHWAY AND THAT SAID EXCESSIVE 
SPEED WAS NEGLIGENCE, IN NOT 
ALSO FINDING THAT SAID NEGLIGENCE 
WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF SAID 
ACCIDENT ----------- ______ ------ ___ ---------_ -------------------- ----------·- 7 
POINT 3. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN 
FAILING TO FIND THAT THE .. PLAIN-
TIFF FAILED TO KEEP A PROPER 
LO~OKOUT AND THAT THE DUTY TO 
KEEP A PROPER LO·OKOUT APPLIES AS 
WELL TO THE. FAVORED DRIVER ON AN 
ARTERIAL HIGHWAY AS TO A DIS-
FAVORED DRliVER ON AN INTERSE·CT-
ING STREET A.ND NEITHER CAN EXC·USE 
HIS OWN FAILURE TO OBSE·RVE BE-
CAUSE THE OTHER DRIVER FAILED 
POINT 4. THAT THE CO·URT ERRED IN 
IN HIS DUTY ---------------------------------------------------------····· '1 
FAILING TO FIND THAT EVEN THOUGH 
A DRIVER MAKING A LEFT TURN MUST 
YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY TO CARS 
WHICH ARE CLOSE ENOUGH TO CO·N-
STITUTE AN IMMEDIATE HA~ARD, 
THAT SAID RULE REQUIRES T'HE EXER-
CISE OF SOME JUDGMENT AND THAT 
THERE IS STILL A DUTY _ON THE PART 
OF THE D·RIVER TRAVELING THE 
ARTERIAL HIGHWAY TO REMAN REAS-
ONABLY ALERT T'O THE POSSIBILITY 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
OF THE DIS-FAVORED DRIVER 
STARTING ACROSS THE INTERSECTION 
IN THE BELIEF THAT HE C·AN CROSS 
IN SAF·ETY\) AND THAT HIS FAILURE TO 
REMAIN ALERT AND OBSERJVE IN 
TIME TO A VOID AN ACCIDENT CAN 
CONTRIBUTE TO AND BE A PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF AN ACCIDENT. --------------------------···-···-·· 8 
POINT 5. THAT_ THE COURT ERRED IN 
FAILING TO FIND THAT ALL RIGHTS 
OF WAY ARE RELATIVE AND THE 
D·UTY TO A VO·ID ACCIDENTS OR C·OL-
LIS.IONS AT STREET INTERSECTIO·NS 
RESTS UPON BOTH DRIVERS ------------- .. ·----------------· 8 
CON CL USI ON .. _____ --------------------------------------.. __ ---···· .............. 25 
CASES CITED 
Cederloff vs. Whited 169 P. 2d 777 -------------------·····--------·--· 11 
Cederloff vs. Whited Supra -------------------------------------------------· 20 
Conklin vs. Walsh 193 P. 2d 437, 439, 440 ---------·-·······---··· 15 
French vs. Utah Oil Refining Co., 216 P 2d 1002 ---------------- 20 
Hardman vs. Thurman et al 239 P. 2d 215m217 -------------- 17 
Hart vs. Kerr 17 5 P. 2d 4 7 5 ------------------------------------------------ 12 
Hickok vs. Skinner 190 P. 2d 514 ........................................ 13 
Whisler vs. Weiss 17 4 P. 2d 766 -----------------------------------------· 23 
Yeates vs. Budge 252 P. 2d 220 ------------------------------------·--····· 22 
Authorities and Legal Encyclopedias Cited 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 Sec. 41-6-46 -------------------------------- 8 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 Sec. 41-6-73 -------------------------------- 9 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 Sec. 41-6-144 ---------------------------- 10 
Utah Code Annotated 1943 Sec. 57-7-133 ---------------------------- 12 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 Sec. 41-6-69 ............................ 12 
Utah ·Code Annotated 1943 Sec. 57-7-205 ;. ___________________________ 19 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 Sec. 41-6-144 --------------------·-·· 20 
Utah Code Annotated 1943 Sec. 57-7-137 ------------------------·· 20 
Utah Code Annotated 1_953 Sec. 41-6-73 ------------------------------ 21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUIPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HOLLIS E. WALKER 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
v-s. 
LEVI G. PETERSEN, 
Defendant and Appellent 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 




This case does not involve a lot of money but the prin-
ciple involved is great and for the reason that the court, in 
making its decision said (R. 130) : 
"Gentlemen, this court is committed to the doctrine 
in these kind of cases, on through highways, the proxi-
mate cause must rest solely on him who makes the left 
turn. Until the Appellate Court overturns that doc-
trine, that will remain the rule in this District." 
He again repeated himself on this doctrine in (R. 131 
line 20) : 
"So, while I find both parties guilty of negligence-
and I repeat that until such time as I am instructed 
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otherwise by an Appellate Tribunal-the findings and 
conclusion must be as indicated by the. language cited 
by coung,el, used by Mr. Justice Wolfe, that he who 
makes the left turn on these through highways must 
take the responsibility irregardless of speed, or any 
other circumstances." 
This theory of the Court, as set out above, unbeknown 
to counsel, was in the mind of the tryer of the facts at the 
beginning of the trial. It mattered not what cases might 
be cited in support of counsel's contentions in behalf of his 
client; it mattered not how careless the opposing party 
might be; what laws he might break or with how much 
speed the opposing party might drive upon a through high-
way, if my client turned to the left and an accident resulted, 
my client is guilty of negligence which, in the· opinion of the 
court, is the sole proximate cause of the accident. The 
other party might be guilty of negligence but under no cir-
cumstances can it be a proximate ·cause. This theory, ac-
cording to the Court will remain the doctrine of this Dis-
trict unless the Appellate Court of the State of Utah in a 
decision appealed from Box Elder County, where the Honor-
able Judge Lewis Jones was presiding, should advise him 
otherwise. 
Consequently I say in all sincerity, and I firmly believe 
that the statements made by the Court (R. 130-131) : 
"This court is committed to the doctrine in these kind 
of cases, on through highways, the proximate cause 
must rest solely on him who makes the left turn - - - -
That he who makes the left turn on these through high-
ways must take the responsibility irre·gardless of speed 
or any other circumstance, - - - - " 
is not the law and never has been and that such a doctrine 
would, in fact, encourag-e dangerous driving for it offers a 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
premium to any person who might be traveling a through 
highway, if he utterly disregards the rights of any person 
who might wish to cross the same, by giving him immunity 
from all his wrongs, regardless of what they are, if an ac-
cident takes place. Consequently this appeal must follow. 
This is an intersection collision. Plaintiff was travel-
ing south on Highway 308 approaching Bear River City, 
Utah. The defendant had been traveling North on said 
highway but stopped his car East of the hard-surface there-
of on said highway and some 20 or 30 feet South from the 
intersection in question for the purpose of talking business 
with another party. The other party had been driving a 
truck but upon receiving a signal from the defendant, he 
stopped his truck on the East side of the highway after he 
had passed the intersection in question and at a point off 
the hard-surface and about 100 feet North from the inter-
section. Both the defendant and the trucker got out of 
their cars and met together in the intersection, East of the 
hard-surfaced portion, and talked over their business. 
When the conversation ended, the defendant went South to 
his parked car and the trucker went North to his parked 
truck and both started their motors, preparatory to driving 
off. The trucker commenced to go back on the hard-surface 
" 
of the highway, slowly, as he proceeded in a northerly di-
rection and the defendant commenced to make a left turn 
at the intersection from the point where he was stopped on 
the East side of the highway, so as to go to his home which 
is located about a block West from that intersection. 
Highway 308 is an arterial highway which passes 
through Main Street, Bear River City, Utah, where the de-
fendant lives. At the intersection in question, both the 
Main Highway and the intersecting street are 99 feet wide. 
The intersecting street is gravel while the arterial highway 
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is hard...~surfaced for 22 feet in the center. North of the in-
tersection and on the West side of the arterial highway at a 
point approximately 375 feet to the North of the intersec-
tion is a State Road sign fixing the speed at 40 miles per 
hour, as you proceed. South from that point. North of that 
sign the posted speed is 60 miles per hour in the daytime. 
Two blocks North of the intersection in question, is a sign 
reading "Entering Bear River City." The day was clear 
and the highway dry and the accident happened at approxi-
mately 11 :45 A. M. The plaintiff testified (R. 57 and 58) 
that when he reached the 40 mile zone, he was doing 60 
miles an hour and the Court (R. 131 line 12) found: 
"In accordance with their testimony I expressly find 
that the plaintiff's car was going over 60 miles an hour 
as it cam·e up to that 40 mile zone and it was going 5 
miles or more in excess of 40 miles an hour as it ap-
proached the intersection." 
The plaintiff claimed that he was going 45 miles an 
hour, jus.t prior to the accident, but admitted that he had 
never looked at his speedometer (R. 72 line 30) . The plain-
tiff'~s wife also testified that just befor·e the collision they 
were doing 40 to 45 miles an hour, but she admits that she 
did not look at the speedometer (R. 75). They both testify 
that they did not see the Petersen car turn West across their 
lane until they were 100 feet away from him (R. 58 line 8) 
(R. 68 line 20) (R. 7 4 line 26). - It so happened that an-
other vehicle was traveling back of the Walker car. The 
party driving it being a Mr. Madsen, and even though he 
was back and further down the highway to the North, he 
testified (R. 84 line 20) that he saw both the truck that was 
parked and the defendant's car that was parked, start to 
move from their positions on the East side of the highway 
at about the same time. One appeared to be going to back 
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upon the highway and going North which was the truck, and 
the other car appearing to make what he thought was a U 
turn, though farther down the street he saw the defendant's 
car turn from its parked position and start west (R. 84) 
across the intersection, even though plaintiff did not see 
him at all until he started across the center line. (R. 58) 
A Highway Patrol Officer testified (R. 97) where the 
point of the accident happened, being on the West side of the 
hard-surface of the road halfway through the intersection. 
That from that point the officer went northerly along the 
road and found skid marks on the cement from the Cadillac 
car, belonging to the plaintiff, for a distance of 148 feet. He 
also testified (R. 98) beginning with line 24, that from the 
point of impact, the Walker car continued for a distance of 
42 feet. Also, that the defendant's car which was a Mer-
cury sedan, was knocked back Southeast across the high-
way from the point of impact, heading the car again in a 
Southeast direction, being just opposite from where it was 
heading, a distance of 72 feet. Or, in other words, the 
plaintiff's car had skid marks of 148 feet prior to the point 
of impact and if we deduct the 148 feet from the 375 feet to 
the reduce speed sign, we would have 227 feet that the Cadil-
lac car traveled before the brakes took hold from the 40 
miles an hour sign and at said. sign the Court found he was 
going in excess of 60 miles per hour which would be just 
2~ seconds travel time at 60 miles an hour. 
Now, this question comes up. Would the speed of the 
Cadillac car in 2~ seconds time when it was traveling in 
excess of 60 miles on hour, drop down without its brakes 
being applied, over two or three miles an hour? The truck 
driver, Brook Shuman, watched the plaintiff's car come 
down the highway (R. 108) when he started to drive his car 
North from its parked position, and we must remember that 
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plaintiff's witness Madsen said they both (defendant and 
Shuman) started to drive off at the same time, that the 
plaintiff's car was at least one block North of where the 
truck was. That he noticed this car coming because there 
was a_ reduce speed sign there and officers had been watch-
ing people rather close in that zone. That he heard the 
brakes go on when the plaintiff's car was just a little in front 
of his truck. Again at (R. 110} this same Mr. Shuman 
testified that he did not see the plaintiff slacken his speed 
at all prior to the 'Screeching of the brakes ; that he was in 
his line of vision all the time and that in his opinion he was 
going sixty miles an hour at the time he applied his brakes. 
On the other hand Mr. Petersen testified (R. 118) and 
(R. 119) that he was well out into the intersection when 
the plaintiff's car reached. the 40 mile zone. He also testi-
fied (R. 122) that he started to drive his car away at the 
same time the truck started to move off. He said he was 
parked between 20 or 30 feet from the intersection on the 
East side of the hard-surfaced portion (R. 124). He testi-
fied on cross examination (R. 125) that he checked the road 
behind him before he started to drive. off. That he gave 
an arm signal and light signal and that the plaintiff was 
then halfway between the 40 mile zone sign and the cross 
road further to the North. Coun~el for plaintiff cross ex-
amined for this and received. the following answer: 
"No, I didn't tell you that, I told you he was half of 
the 40 miles where the 40 mile zone starts. He was in 
the half of that other block where that street comes 
down. 
Q. Then you are trying to tell me he was still in the 
60 mile zone ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So he was still in the 60 mile zone when you pulled 
off on to the highway? 
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A. That's right. 
If this estimate were correct then the plaintiff was between 
550 and 600 feet away when the defendant started to drive 
across the street. 
Petersen admitted that he did not continue to watch the 
Walker car all the tirae, after he had determined that it 
was safe to cross and after he had started in a westerly di-
rection, he did not look again to the North until the plaintiff 
honked his horn (R. 127) and that he was across the center 
line heading West when he heard the horn honked. That 
he estimated his own speed between 5 and 6 miles an 
hour (R. 129) . 
After both parties rested, the Court announced his doc-
trine that the proximate cause must rest solely on him who 
makes the left turn irregardless of speed or any other cir-
cumstance, but found plaintiff guilty of negligence. 
STATEMENT' O·F PO~INTS 
POINT 1. That the Court erred in failing to find the 
plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence, after he found 
the plaintiff guilty of negligence. 
POINT 2. That the Court erred after finding that the 
plaintiff was driving too fast for existing conditions and 
was driving in excess of the posted speed upon said highway 
and that said excessive speed was negligence in not also 
finding that said negligence was a proximate cause of said 
accident. 
POINT 3. That the Court erred in failing to find that 
the plaintiff failed to keep a proper lookout and that the 
duty to keep a proper lookout applies as well to the favored 
driver on an arterial highway as to a dis-favored driver on 
an intersecting street and neither can excuse his own fail-
ure to observe because the other driver faild in his duty. 
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POINT 4. That the Court erred in failing to find that 
even though a driver making a left turn must yield the right 
of way to cars which a~e close enough to constitute an im-
mediate hazard, that said rule requires the exercise of 
some judgment and that there is still a duty on the part of 
the driver traveling the arterial highway to remain reason-
ably alert to the possibility of the dis-favored driver start-
ing across the intersection in the belief that he can cross in 
safety, and. that his failure to remain alert and observe in 
time to avoid an accident can contribute to and be a proxi-
mate cause of an accident. 
POINT 5. That the Court erred in failing to find. that 
all rights of way are relative and the duty to avoid accidents 
or collisions at street intersections rests upon both drivers. 
ARGUMENT 
Inasmuch as all of the above points are closely related 
and can be discussed together, the argument hereafter will 
be addressed collectively to all of them. 
Now first I wish to cite some of the sections of our 
Utah Code. 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 41-6-46. Speed regula-
tions-Maximum speeds-School buses and school build-
ings-lnte·rsections-Powers of Governor-(a) No per-
son shall drive a v·ehicle on a highway at a speed great-
er than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions 
and having regard to the actual and potential hazards 
then existing. In every event speed shall be so control-
led as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any per-
son, vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the 
highway in compliance with legal requirements and the 
duty of all persons to use due care. 
(b) Where no special hazard exi~sts the following 
speeds shall be lawful but any speed in excess of said 
limits shall be prima facie evidence that the speed is not 
reasonable or prudent and that it is unawful: 
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(1) Twenty miles per hour. 
Upon meeting or overtaking any school bus which has 
stopped on the highway for the purpose of receiving or 
discharging any school children, provided, such school 
bus bears upon the front and rear thereof a plainly 
visible sign containing the words school bus in letters 
not less than 4 inches in height which can be removed 
or covered when the vehicle is not in use as a school bus. 
When passing a school building or the grounds there-
of during school recess or while children are going to or 
leaving school during opening or closing hours; provi-
ded, that local authorities may require a complete stop 
before passing a school building or grounds at any of 
said periods. 
(2) Twenty-five miles per hour in any business or 
residential district. 
(3) Sixty miles per hour in other locations during 
the daytime. 
(4) Fifty miles per hour in such other locations dur-
ing the night-time. Daytime means from half hour 
before sunrise to half hour after sunset. Night-time 
means at any other hour. 
(c) The driver of every vehicle shall, consistent 
with the requirements of subdivision (a) of this section, 
drive at an appropriate reduced speed when approach-
ing and crossing an intersection or railway grade cross-
ing, when approaching and going around a curv~, when 
approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any nar-
row or winding road, and when special ha'zard exists 
with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by rea-
son of weather or highway conditions. 
(d) Provided, that the governor by proclamation, 
in time of war, or national emergency, may upon re-
commendation of the federal authorities, change the 
speed on the highways of the state, to conform to such 
recommendations. 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 41-6-73 Vehicle turning left 
at intersection.-The driver of a vehicle within an inter-
section intending to turn to the left shall yield the 
right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the op... 
posite direction which is within the intersection or so 
close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard, but 
said driver, having so yielded and having given a sig-
nal when and as required by this act, may make such 
left turn and the drivers of all other vehicles approach-
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ing the intersection from said opposite direction shall 
yield the right-of-way to the vehicle making the left 
turn. 
Utah· Code Annotated 1953 41-6-144. Brakes-Equip-
ment required-Performance standard-Condition-
(a) the following brake equipment is required.. 
(1) Every motor vehicle, other than a motorcycle 
or motor-driven cycle when operated upon a nighway 
shall be equipped with brakes adequate to control the 
movement of and to stop and hold such vehicle, includ-
ing two separate means of applying the brakes, each of 
which means shall be effective to apply the brakes to 
at least two wheels. If these two separate means of 
applying the brakes are connected in any way, they 
shall be so constructed that failure of any one part of 
the operating mechanism shaH not leave the motor ve-
hicle without brakes on at least two .lVheels. 
(b) Every motor vehicle or combination of motor 
drawn vehicles shall be capable at aH times, and under 
all conditions of loading, of being stopped on a dry, 
smooth, level road free from loose material, upon appli-
cation of the service (foot) brake, within the distance 
specified below, or shall be capable of being decelerated 
at a sustained rate correspon<11ng to tnese di'Stances: 
Vehicles or combin-
ations of vehiclei 
having brakes on all 
wheels. 
Vehicles or comb in-
a tions of vehicles 
not having brakes 
on all wheels. 
J.1~eet to stop Decelerated In 
from 20 miles ~ =eet per ~econd 
P·er hour Per Second 
30 14 
40 10.7 
Now, can't we say this: If the plaintiff were going 45 
miles per hour and saw the defendant at a distance that has 
to be 250 feet or more (he left tire marks for 148 feet plus 
time element to react at his speed per hour) and if his 
brakes met the requirements of Section 41-6-144 he could 
have stopped in sufficient time to avoid the accident? If 
he did not stop then he was traveling faster than that speed. 
or he was negligent in not having his car equipped with 
brakes that could stop him in the distance required by the 
10 
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statutes. Also, under the speed section 41-6-46, he must 
have his car under control; drive no faster than is reason-
able; reduce his speed when approaching an intersection and 
be alert and attentive. If he drives. in a forty mile zone and 
into an intersection at such a speed that he leaves brake 
marks for a distance of 148 feet prior to the collision, and 
42 feet thereafter and knocks a Mercury automobile 72 
feet in the opposite direction, can we say that he satisfied 
the requirements of our statutes or must we conclude that 
his action, or lack of action was a proximate cause of the 
collision. 
Again the section on the rights of making a left turn 
at an intersection does not define what distances amount to 
"or so close thereto as. to con~titute an immediate hazard," 
and each case has to be determined individually. Conse-
quently the cases, a number of which are list·ed hereafter, 
hold that the rights and duties of each are relative and 
neither has an absolute right of way over the other when 
two vehicles are approaching each other and one intends to 
make a left turn and as a matter of law neither can dis-
regard the other. So now to the cases. 
Cases: Plaintiff seems to lean quite heavily on the C·eder-
loff vs Whited 169 P. 2d 777. This case is not in point for 
the following reasons: Plaintiff brought the action to re-
cover damages for injuries which she sustained in an auto-
mobile collision between her car which was driven by her 
son and a car driven by the defendant. The jury returned 
a verdict of no cause of action and Plaintiff appealed and re-
versed. Plaintiff's car was being driven in a northerly di-
rection on State Street on the east side of the street in the 
traffic lane nearest the center. At the same time the de-
fendant was driving his car in a southerly direction. When 
11 
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these cars were in the middle of the block the defendant 
turned his car to the left into the course traveled by the 
plaintiff's car and the two cars collided. The point of im-
pact was a few feet east of the center line of the street. 
The point of impact indicated that the front part of defen-
dant's car was all that got beyond the center line of the 
street. The testimony shows that plaintiff's car was trav-
eling 25 to 30 miles an hour prior to the accident with 
lighted head lights which complied with legal requirements. 
The evidence also showed that the defendant put his arm 
out of the window and signaled a left turn and that when 
he did so he had slowed his car down to five miles an hour 
at the time of the collision, but that he did not see plaintiff's 
car at all before the collision. The plaintiff contended that 
as a matter of law, defendant's negligence was the sole 
proximate cause of the collision and the resulting damage. 
The court in making its determination, cited Sections 57-
7-133 Utah Code Annotated 1943 which is the same as our 
Section 41-6-69 and it is not an intersection case. The 
court went on to show that under the circumstances in that 
particular case, the driver of plaintiff's car would. either 
believe that the defendant's car was slowing down waiting 
for plaintiff to pass, or that the turning was made at such 
a point where it would be physically impossible to avoid the 
collision. The court found. that the sole proximate cause, 
on the facts therein stated, was the left turn made by de-
fendent, but it was not an intersection left turn. One of the 
later cases shows the difference. 
We have another case involving a turn in the center of 
a block which is Hart vs. Kerr, cited as 175 P.2d 475. This 
was an accident that took place in Ogden. The plaintiff 
was traveling north on the east side of Washington Blvd. in 
O~gden, Utah. When he reached a point near the corner of 
12 
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17th Street, he was forced by repair work upon the highway 
to turn to his left and upon the east lane of the west side 
of Washington, in order to continue on north, had that 
been his intention. At the same time the defendant was 
driving south on Washington Blvd. on the west side thereof, 
leaving room for north bound traffic to pass the ob-
struction. However at that point, the plaintiff, instead 
of continuing north, made a left turn for the purpose of 
parking on the west side of Washington Blvd. and the de-
fendant's automobile crashed into his side as he made the 
left turn. The record showed the defendant was traveling 
35 to 50 miles an hour and the court held as a matter of law, 
that he was. guilty of negligence. The lower court also 
held that the plaintiff viola ted the requirements of Section 
57-7-133 Utah code annotated 1943 which are turns from 
a direct course on a highway and that he was guilty of 
negligence and denied the plaintiff relief upon his com-
plaint as well as the defendant on his counter claim. From 
this the plaintiff appealed and the only thing before the 
Supreme Court was whether or not the plaintiff was negli-
gent when he made a left turn. They held that he was when 
he failed to yield right of way. 
So, in substance, this case is one where the defendant 
was speeding and the plaintiff was making a left turn 
and neither recovered. 
Another Utah case that has been cited is Hickok vs. 
Skinner 190 P.2d 514. This covered an accident that 
happened at the intersection of 21st South Street and West 
Temple Street. 21st South Street is an arterial highway 
running east and west with stop signs placed so as to stop 
traffic coming from the north and south. The plaintiff 
was traveling north on West T'emple and his testimony is 
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that he came to a stop at the stop sign, he waited for some 
traffic coming from the west and then looked east and saw 
an automobile more than a half a block away, between 400 
and 500 feet east of the intersection. He also claims that 
there was some traffic coming from the north that required 
his attention because a driver might make a left hand turn, 
so plaintiff started up and figured that he had plenty of 
time to cross the intersection. He never again looked to the 
east and his car was struck by the defendant's automobile. 
On the other hand the defendant's speed, according to what 
the defendant told the investigating officer, was 45 miles per 
hour and the posted speed limit for the street was 35 miles 
per hour. There were no skid marks before the impact. 
The trial court held the plaintiff guilty of contributory neg-
ligence. The defendant no doubt admitted. his own negli-
gence and relied on contributory negligence. There was a 
City ordinance similar to the State statute which required 
the driver who had stopped at the stop sign to yield the 
right of way to other vehicles which have entered the inter-
section or which were approaching so closely on said high-
way as to constitute an immediate hazard, but said driver 
having so yielded may proceed and the driver's of all other 
vehicles approaching the intersection on said through high-
way shall yield right of way to the vehicle so proceeding into 
or across the through highway. The court, in analyzing 
the case held that when the defendant was 400 to 500 feet 
back from the intersection that he was not so close thereto 
as to constitute an immediate hazard, but that the court 
held that plaintiff had to be more observant and he could 
not look only the once and fail to ever look again and that 
as a consequence, he was guilty of contributory negligence. 
There was a strong descenting opinion, by Judge Wolfe. 
14 
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Another interesting case is Conklin vs. Walsh 193 P. 
2d 437 and in the syllabus they laid down this: 
"The duty to keep a proper lookout applies as well to 
the favored driver on arterial highway as to disfavored 
driver on intersecting street, and neither can excuse 
his own failure to observe because the other driver 
failed in his duty." 
Which to me is the crux that we have before the court in 
this case. 
In the above case the suit was first tried in the City 
Court of Salt Lake City, where judgment was rendered in 
favor of the respondents and against the appellants. It was 
then appealed to the District Court and tried before a jury. 
When both sides had rested the court directed a verict in 
favor of the plaintiff Clifford E. Conklin and against the 
defendant. In so directing the verdict the court concluded 
that both drivers were guilty of negligence, but that Mrs. 
Conklin was not an agent or servant of her husband the 
plaintiff, and therefor her negligence was not imputable to 
him. The two principal questions raised on the appeal are: 
(1) Did the Trial Court err in finding that the de-
fendant Robert A. Walsh was negligent as a matter of law. 
(2) Did the Trial Court err in finding that Mrs. 
Conklin was not the agent or servant of her huband in the 
operation of his automobile. 
The facts were that the accident happened on South 
Temple Street where it is intersected by 0 Street from the 
north and by lOth East Street from the south. South 
Temple Street is the arterial highway and is 60 feet wide 
and 0 Street is 30 feet wide. Mrs. Conklin, driving her 
husband's car and taking their daughter to a neighborhood 
child's dancing lesson, drove the car out of 0 Street and 
south to South Temple. She stopped before entering the 
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intersection, claimed she looked both ways and then pro-
ceeded to cross the intersection looking straight ahead with-
out again looking to the left and the right. Walsh was 
driving east along South Temple at a speed variously esti-
mated at 30 to 45 miles per hour. He claims he saw Mrs. 
Conklin drive up towards the intersection and then look in 
the opposite direction to see what was coming and when he 
looked back she was right in front of him. He-'turned his 
vehicle to the right but the accident happened. 
The court made some observations about the truck 
driver who was traveling up the arterial street and said on 
page 439: 
"By his own admission the truck driver traveled at 
least one quarter of a block without making any further 
observation of a car which, at the time he first saw it, 
was much nearer the intersection than was his. He as-
serts his attention was focused on traffic that might be 
coming from the south. If, as he claims, he was un-
able to get a clear view to the south on lOth East Street, 
there was nothing to prev·ent him from reducing the 
speed of his truck so as to permit a reasonable oppor-
tunity to observe the approaching cars from other di-
rections. In this case we have the driver of a truck 
traveling between 30 and 45 miles per hour who knows 
a car is approaching from his left, keeping his eye on 
what he claims to be a blind corner on his right, and ig-
noring the approach of the vehicle from his left. Be-
cause of the assumption that as to the later car he has 
the right of way. Under the facts of this case, either 
the defendants were or were not, as a matter of law, 
guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to 
the accident!" 
Again on the right hand columm, of page 439, speaking of 
the relative responsibility of both people on the highway, 
the court said : 
"The defendant truck driver was not justified in thus 
ignoring the movement of plaintiff's automobile. The 
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duty to keep a proper lookout applies as well to the fa-
vored as to the disfavored driver. Neither driver can 
excuse his own failure to observe because the other 
driver failed in his duty. Neither driver is at any 
time to be excused for want of vigilance or failure to 
see what is plain to be seen. D·rivers are permitted to 
cross over arterial highways after having stopped. 
True, they must yield the right of-way to cars which 
are close enough to constitute an immediate hazard. 
This rule, however, required the ·exercise of some 
judgment. There is still a duty on the part of the 
driver traveling the arterial highway to remain reason-
ably alert to the possibility of the di§favored driver 
starting across the intersection in the belief that he 
can cross in safety. The duty of keeping a proper 
lookout attends all those operating motor vehicles and 
other rules of the road do not relieve any driver of the 
necessity of complying with this requirement." 
Again on page 440 the court said: 
"The driver having failed to s·ee plaintiff's automobile 
until too late to a void the collision, we see no escape 
from the conclusion that he did not keep a proper look-
out and was guilty of negligence in that omission. The 
trial court so held." 
The court went on to hold that there is no family purpose 
doctrine in the use of an automobile in the State of Utah. 
This being the husband's car, the negligence of the wife was 
not imputable to the husband and consequently the judg-
ment of the lower court in favor of the plaintiff was af-
firmed and the man on the arterial highway, who failed to 
keep a proper lookout, even though he was a favored driver, 
was held to have driven negligently and that his negligence 
was a proximate cause of the injury. 
Another interesting case was Hardman vs. Thurman et 
a1 239 P. 2d 215. This was an action by Ruth Bunker 
Hardman, an administratrix of her husband's estate against 
Thurman and Wood, doing business as Dickey Wood Pro-
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duce Company. This was an intersection case and took 
place about 9 :30 P. M. on October 29, 1949, at the corner of 
21st South and State Street in Salt Lake City. It appears 
that south of 21st South Street there are six lanes of traffic 
and north of 21st South Street there are four. At the time 
of the accident, Mrs. Hardiman was driving in a southerly 
direction on State Street and intended to turn east on 21st 
South Street. Her husband was riding in the front seat 
with her, holding their small child. She was driving in the 
lane next to the center lane. It appears that she stopped 
at 21st South Street momentarily to permit north bound 
traffic to proceed through the intersection. On the oppo-
site side an oil tanker was proceeding north in the first lane 
east of the center lane and it had stopped at the south line 
of the intersection and signaled for a left turn to go west. 
There was a second car in the lane east of the oil tanker 
which was proceeding north but it stopped so that Mrs. 
Hardman could turn left and Mrs. Hardman observed no 
car in the third lane to the east, but as her car reached a 
point where it would be crossing the third traffic lane to the 
east if said lane had extended out in the intersection, the 
trailer truck operated by the defendants in the third driv-
ing lane came through the intersection and struck the Hard-
man car sideways and knocked it across to the north curb. 
Mr. Hardman received injuries from which he died the fol-
lowing day. There were some tire marks of the truck 
trailer which showed the distance the wheels, or some of 
them skidded when the brakes were applied. The speed of 
the truck was estimated at various speeds from 20 to 42 
miles per hour. The speed on State Street at 21st South 
was 40 miles per hour and 35 miles per hour north of that 
intersection. A physicist who was called to testify as an 
expert on the basis of the skid marks and the weight of the 
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trailer estimated the speed at 42 miles per hour. The 
driver testified that he was only driving 20 miles per hour. 
The defendant sought reversal on the following grounds: 
(1) That the court erred in denying defendant's mo-
tion for a directed verdict, since there is no evidence in the 
record to support a finding of negligence upon the part of 
the driver of defendant's trailer truck and. that the evi-
dence requires the finding that the driver of decedent's car 
was negligent. 
(2) That incompetent evidence was admitted. 
(3) That the court erred. in refusing to give certain 
instructions requested by defendant. 
The first ground is the one that, for the purpose of this 
case, we would be interested in. The court said on the left 
hand column, page 217: 
"The assignments directed at the lack of evidence of 
negligence upon the part of the driver of defendant's 
truck is overruled. The testimony of such driver was 
itself such as to warrant the finding that he was driv-
ing negligently in the following particulars : ( 1) There 
was some evidence in the record from which the jury 
could conclude that from the driver's elevated position 
in the cab of the truck he would be able to see the 
Hardman car as it proceeded to make a turn on Twenty-
First South Street. He admitted that he did not see 
it until after he got into the intersection. If he did 
not see the Hardman car, he was negligent by reason of 
being inattentive, and in proceeding into the intersec-
tion without ascertaining whether it was safe for him 
to proceed. (2) In traveling at an excessive rate of 
speed under the circumstances into the intersection. 
The evidence adduced relative to the speed of the 
truck, plus the fact that there was a car stopped to his 
left although the green light was showing southward, 
would indicate that it was not safe to proceed through 
the intersection. The fact that he was unable to bring 
his truck to a stop within 30 feet after the application 
of the brakes, as required by Sec. 57-7-205 (b,c) would 
warrant a conclusion that he was traveling at a greater 
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speed than 20 miles per hour. As evidenced by the 
length of the tire marks, 126 feet, less the length of the 
trailer-truck, 51 feet, the truck moved forward about 75 
feet from the point where the truck finally stopped. 
From the point where the brakes were applied to the 
point of impact, the truck moved about 30 feet, and 
from the point of impact the Hardman car was push-
ed sideways a little over 45 feet. (3) In failing to 
yield the right of way to a vehicle in the intersection 
in the act of turning in accordance with Sec. 57-7-137, 
U.C.A. 1943, which section we will have occasion to 
refer to in connection with the defendants' argument 
relative to negligence on the part of the driver of the 
Hardman car." 
The court then went on to distinguish that case from the 
Cederloff vs. Whited, Supra and French vs. Utah Oil Re-
fining Company, Supra. The interesting thing about this 
cas·e is however, that the court points out that the defen-
dant, because of his position on the road, could have seen 
and thereby had to be alert. That if he did not see what 
was plainly before him, then he was inattentive, which is 
negligence. That he was traveling at an exccessive rate of 
speed and a speed in excess of Sec. 57-7-205, which is simi-
lar with slight changes made that require faster stopping 
at the present time to our Section 41-6-144 in the 1953 code. 
Another Utah case is French vs. Utah Oil Refining 
Company 216 P. 2d 1002. In that action plaintiff was driv-
ing an automobile north on Se-cond West Street in Salt Lake 
City, which is an arterial highway. The defendant was 
driving south along the same street. North of 4th South 
on Second West Street there is a four lane highway and 
south of 4th South there is a two lane highway. As plain-
tiff approached the intersection of 4th South and Second 
West he intended to turn west or make a left turn. The 
green light was shining and he therefore proceeded into the 
intersection and as he crossed its south border, he noticed 
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some traffic coming from the opposite direction. One being 
the defendant's vehicle in the west lane. It appears that 
he first saw the truck 100 to 120 feet north of the inter-
section, the exact distance could not be determined, but did 
not see it again until it was about six feet from the point 
of impact. It appears as he turned left and reached the 
west limit of the intersection, the truck came through and 
struck him on the right side. The truck stopped almost at 
the point of impact, but the force of the collision turned and 
pushed plaintiff's car about four feet. Plaintiff estimated 
his spe·ed at about 8 miles per hour and the speed of the 
truck about 20 to 25 miles an hour. The court said that 
while it was doubtful that plaintiff established any negli-
gence on the part of the defendant's driver, they weren't 
going into that question because the court held the plaintiff 
guilty of contributory negligence. The Section involved 
was Sec. 57-7-137, similar to our Sec. 41-6-73. The court 
went on, on page 1003 and said: 
"Accordingly excessive speed of the truck or inaccurate 
estimation by the plaintiff of its rate ·of movement for-
ward is not involved." 
There being no speed problem involved, the court went 
on in its deliberations to show that if they took the speed of 
both vehicles that the impact was bound to occur at the 
point where it did. Consequently it was not safe for the 
plaintiff to conclude that he could turn and that as a con-
sequence the truck was so close that it could say as a matter 
of law, it constituted a hazard. Counsel for defendant 
claims that this case is not in point with the case that we 
have before the court for the reason that speed in our case 
is a vital factor. The ability of the plaintiff to stop his 
car, is a vital factor when he exceeds the speed limit. His 
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ability to always have his car under control is a vital factor 
when he exceeds the speed limit. His ability to actually see 
what is before him is also reduced when speed is involved. 
Another Utah case is Yeates vs. Budge 252 P. 2d 220. 
This is a case that was appealed from the First District. It 
appears that there were two actions that were combined. 
One Yeates vs. Budge and one Budge vs. Yeates, growing 
out of an automobile accident that took place at the point 
of the "Y" just south of Logan. The accident occured Sep-
tember 11, 1951, at the junction on this "Y". Mrs. Yeates 
had left Logan and was proceeding south on the outside 
west lane, intending to take the highway to Nibley. She 
gave an arm signal and moved into the inside lane, next to 
the double center line. Her speed was 25 miles per hour. 
Budge was traveling northeast on U. S. Highway 91 ap-
proaching the junction. It appears that Mrs. Yeates saw 
the other car and knew that the other car intended to go 
into Logan, but that without signaling she applied her 
brakes and turned her car to the left across the path of the 
Budge vehicle, not knowing whether she could safely pro-
ceed or not. A collision took place when the front end of 
her automobile was over the center line and her car was 
practically stopped. Budge testified that he was doing ap-
proximately 35 miles per hour. He had seen the Yeates 
vehicle from about 500 feet up the road, but there was an 
ambulance that was coming and he decreased his speed 
further. He had no idea that Mrs. Yeates intended to go 
to Nihley until the two vehicles were about 25 to 30 feet 
apart, and she abruptly turned across his path without sig-
naling beforehand her intention to do so. That he applied 
his brakes and turned to the right, but struck the right 
front end of her car. It appeared from the measurement of 
skid marks, after subtracting the length of the automobiles 
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that the cars were about 40 feet apart when the brakes on 
both cars were applied. The court said on page 223, left 
column: 
"While the evidence was all to the effect that Budge's 
speed was below the posted speed limit, the court could 
h~ve reasonably found that it was too fast for exist-
ing conditions. However, in view of the fact that Mrs. 
Yeates admittedly did not signal her intention to turn 
on the Highway 101, that there was testimony and phy-
sical evidence that Mrs. Yeates made her turn when 
Budge was only 40 feet away, it was not unreasonable 
to conclude that Budge's negligence was not a proximate 
cause of the ensuing accident (in order to stop in 40 
feet a vehicle could only be traveling about 20 miles an 
hour according to figures published by the Utah High-
way Patrol) the front wheels of the Y,eates car were 
only 9 feet over the center lines when the collision oc-
curred, indicating that Budge was very close when she 
turned to cross his path. Thus the lower court could 
have concluded that had Budge been driving at a proper 
speed in view of existing .conditions, he would have 
nevertheless been helpless to stop short of colliding 
with the Yeates vehicle. It is no answer to say that 
Budge could have avoided the accident by turning to 
the left and pass to the rear or the west of the Yeates 
vehicle, since to have done so would have placed Budge 
on the wrong side of the four lane highway at a curve. 
We cannot say the lower court was compelled to find 
him negligent in not doing so, even though there was 
testimony that the west side of the highway at that 
point was free from traffic." 
Consequently in this case we have no speed violation involv-
ed. The turning was so close that regardless of speed a 
person could not have avoided the accident; no signal was 
given and consequently the decision was affirmed. 
Another interesting case was Whisler vs. Weiss cited 
as 174 P. 2d 766; this was before the Supreme Court of the 
State of Washington, November 21st, 1946. This was a 
very lengthy and involved case. One party, Whisler, was 
driving south on a through street. Weiss was going west 
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to a stop sign. There was a blind side. Weiss moved out 
and saw the car of Whisler 150 to 200 feet down the Street 
and tried to drive across, but the accident took place. The 
lower court tried the case without a jury and found defen-
dant entitled to recover, on a cross complaint, and denied 
the plaintiff any right of recovery. There was a motion for 
vacating judgment and a new trial. The court then vaca-
ted and held both parties guilty of negligence and t.hen the 
appeal was the result, and the appeal was sustained. The 
court said on page 774, right hand column: 
"(3.4) It is true Mrs. Whisler was on the arterial, and 
we think, under the evidence, it can be said that her car 
and the Weiss car were simultaneously approaching a 
point in the intersection. However, we have often 
· stated, that all rights of way are relative, and the duty 
to avoid accidents or collisions at street intersections 
rests upon both drivers. While it is true that the pri-
mary duty of avoiding accidents rests upon the driver 
to the left, the favored driver, whether he be such by 
reason of being on an arterial highway or on the right, 
cannot proceed to cross an intersection regardless of 
what conditions may confront him relative to traffic 
approaching from the opposite direction. 
(5) It should also be kept in mind that there is a blin-
ker light over the center of this intersection, which is 
a warning to drivers on this arterial, as well as to dri-
vers on the stop street, to drive cautiously. 
· · In the instant case, the trial court was justified in 
assuming that Mrs. Whisler had she been using reason-
able care to watch out for traffic as she approached 
this intersection, could and should have seen the Weiss 
car when she was at least 150 feet from the intersection. 
Had she been excercising such care, she could and 
should have seen the Weiss car move out into the inter-
section, apparently with the intention of crossing ahead 
of her. However, she testified she saw no car in the 
intersection as she approached it, and did not see the 
Weiss car until she was near the middle of the inter-
section, when she first saw it coming directly toward 
her on the left and about 15 feet away. Mrs. Whisler's 
sister did not see the Weiss car at all." 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion I call the Court's attention to the physical 
facts which are not disputed. Plaintiff left tire marks 
for 148 feet to point of collision and 42 feet thereafter. He 
smashed into defendant's big Mercury Sedan with such 
force to turn it around in the opposite direction and throw 
it back up the road 72 feet. Could this have possibly taken 
place unless plaintiff was traveling at least 60 miles an hour 
when his brakes were applied? If he was going that fast, 
he was then in a 40 mile ~one. 
Also, the defendant must drive from a position on the east 
side of the highway and at a point 20 to 30 feet south of it 
in a northwest direction and he does it 5 to 6 miles per hour. 
He is in a position on the highway where he can be seen by 
by plaintiff all of the distance yet plaintiff says he does not 
see him until he starts west into his lane in the· intersection. 
Where, in the name of heaven was the plaintiff looking? 
He was required by statute to be alert; to reduce his speed 
at intersections; to see what's plainly before him; to drive 
at a speed so his car is always under control; so that his car 
can stop if needs be and avoid a collision. Did he do any of 
this? No. So the Court said he was guilty of negligence, 
but the Court also said because the defendant turned left 
the full responsibility is on him and plaintiff is forgiven. 
I do not believe this is the law. I think such a principle is 
dangerous and would just add to the conflict and woes of all 
users of the highway. T'his defendant respectfully re-
quests this Court to reverse the decision of the lower court 
and hold plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence. 
Respectfully submitted 
Walter G. Mann 
Attorney for defendant 
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